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ABSTRACT 
The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of the nature of the link between internal coherence and risk 
aversion. Both variables play an important role in individual decisions concerning risk behaviors. We compare the 
levels of internal consistency and risk aversion among smokers and non-smokers. To measure the individual internal 
coherence and risk aversion, we use a survey that includes lottery questions. Our results confirm that smokers are 
consistent in their decisions and they behave as risk averse. These results should be treated with circumspection as 
lottery questions are based on monetary expectations that depend on socio-economic conditions and they obviate 
other dimensions such as social recognition.  
Keywords: Risk aversion; expected utility; decision-making; risk behaviors. 
Consistencia interna y aversión al riesgo: implicaciones en la 
decisión de fumar 
RESUMEN 
La principal contribución de este artículo es analizar la naturaleza de la asociación entre la coherencia interna y la 
aversión al riesgo. Ambas variables juegan un papel principal en las decisiones individuales sobre comportamientos 
de riesgo, tal que como caso particular, comparamos los niveles consistencia interna y aversión al riesgo entre 
fumadores y no fumadores. Para medir la coherencia interna y la aversión al riesgo individual, recurrimos a una 
encuesta que incluye preguntas de loterías. Nuestros resultados confirman que los fumadores son consistentes en sus 
decisiones, y de hecho, se comportan como adversos al riesgo. Estos resultados hay que tomarlos con cautela, pues 
las preguntas sobre loterías se basan principalmente en expectativas monetarias que dependen de condiciones socio-
económicas obviando otras dimensiones como el reconocimiento social. 
Palabras clave: Aversión al riesgo; utilidad esperada; toma de decisiones; comportamientos de riesgo. 
JEL Classification: D81 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The state of health is an accumulative process that depends on both the 
health goods and services that citizens receive and their life styles. Risk 
behaviors, such as smoking, heavy drinking and lack of physical exercise 
reinforce the incidence of illnesses that, in most cases, could be avoided. The 
burden of risk habits imposes such a high costs to the individual and society in 
general that preventive policies are increasingly important in the structure of 
public budgets. 
Anti-drug policies are essentially twofold: supply-side measures (taxes and 
control of trafficking) and demand-side measures (new endowments of 
information). Indirect taxes represent one of the most commonly applied 
instruments used to control alcohol and tobacco demand: higher tax rates 
increase prices and reduce purchasing power (Lewit Coate, 1982; Pogue Sgontz, 
1989; Keeler et al., 1993; Saffer Chaloupka, 1994; Crawford Tanner, 1995; 
Chaloupka Wechsler, 1997; Crawford et al., 1999; Escario Molina, 2004). With 
regards to new endowments of information, informative campaigns are justified 
if consumers are currently misinformed about the characteristics of the goods 
they consume (Slovic, 2000; Duarte et al., 2006). For example, if smokers 
undervalue the dangers of tobacco products, once they are properly informed, 
they will reconsider their decisions about smoking. The new endowment of 
information will be effective if it changes the individual’s structure of 
preferences. The effectiveness of providing more information to prevent drug 
use is disputed. Viscusi (1990) affirms that drug-consumers make decisions 
whilst aware of the risks they are taking, even though they might not have a 
clear idea of the magnitude of these risks. 
Risk aversion indexes are fundamental measures to evaluate the degree of 
aversion with which citizens make decisions. Risk aversion indexes are based 
on individual optimal risk levels on a scale of preferences. Experiments such as 
those that require the answers to lottery games, offer social researchers a 
powerful tool for calculating individual levels of risk aversion. In lottery 
questions, participants usually reveal their preferences for a fixed amount of 
money or a lottery ticket. The expected utility framework has been implemented 
to analyze risk attitudes and behaviors with data drawn from lottery games 
(Blondel et al., 2007; Dave Saffer, 2007; Sasaki et al., 2006; Schunk Winter, 
2007; Wärneryd, 1996).  
The main advantage of using lottery questions is that they are characterized 
by informative transparency and uncertainty. A lottery game is defined by 
outcomes and probabilities so participants foresee the occurrence of an outcome 
and make the corresponding decisions. If they were wrongly informed about 
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outcomes and/or the probabilities, they would not be able to make correct 
decisions.  
The authors believe that lottery questions are suitable for general indexes of 
risk aversion because, for example, smoking also implies the two dimensions: 
smoking generates illnesses to a degree of probability - a World Health 
Organization anti-tobacco campaign states that smokers have a 12-times higher 
probability of suffering from laryngeal cancer than non-smokers (WHO, 1998). 
Citizens know that smoking is dangerous but they might be wrongly informed 
about the dangers of smoking and/or the probability of occurrence. 
What might seem a relatively easy mathematical exercise becomes more 
complex in reality because individuals are not always consistent with their scale 
of preferences. If people fail in ordering their preferences, the endowment of 
information (warning labels, anti-drug commercials or informative pamphlets 
etc.) might cause the expected effects, but probably not in the desired 
dimension. Given that governments allocate important economic resources in 
health policies aimed at promoting healthy habits (especially informative 
strategies), the implications of this research are important for policy makers. If 
smokers make mistakes when ordering preferences, demand-side measures 
might have limited impact on reducing tobacco consumption it might therefore 
be more useful to implement supply-side measures, such as higher taxes or 
tougher trafficking controls. 
The main contribution of this paper is to explore the nature of the link 
between individual internal inconsistency and the degree of risk aversion. Both 
variables play an important role in individual decisions concerning risk 
behaviors. We compare the levels of internal inconsistency and risk aversion 
among smokers and non-smokers. We use lottery questions to measure the 
individual internal coherence and risk aversion. We use data from the German 
Personality and Daily Life Survey (2004) because it gives important 
information on internal coherence and risk aversion indexes. Our results 
confirm that smokers are consistent in their decisions, and they even behave as 
risk averse. It is clear that they perceive themselves as risk averse. 
The rest of the paper is structured as it follows: Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical framework; Section 3 deals with the data base; Section 4 summaries 
the main results and Section 5 concludes the work with the main findings of our 
research and the corresponding policy implications. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Anyone who faces the choice of different options in a framework of 
uncertainty will consider the consequences of the choices and their 
corresponding probabilities. The expected utility theory offers a simple measure 
based on a set of information about a lottery  which is fully represented by L
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The expected utility hypothesis can be derived from three axioms: ordering, 
continuity and independence. The ordering axiom implies that individuals are 
able to determine their preferences from among different options, it requires 
completeness and transitivity. The continuity axiom determines that if there are 
three outcomes which are ordered by the level of preference, there is always a 
probability, a compound option with the most preferable and less preferable 
multiplied by this probability is indifferent to the second best option multiplied 
by one minus this probability. The independence axiom makes it possible to 
keep the structure of the preferences when relaxing the value of the probability 
(Lancsar Louviere, 2006; Starmer, 2000). 
We assume, for reasons of simplicity, that the choices people face involve 
three different outcomes, ,  and  ( ) thus , 
 and 
RH RLy Sy RLS yy   RLyu
 yu S x  with 10  x
Lp
. The expected utility criteria for 
choosing between two options, one that is of higher risk 
  RLRLRHRH pypyR Hp  ,  ;, 1.0  ;  and one that is safer SS py ,S   is 
to select that option that is associated with a higher expected utility: 
S HS pxpR        (2) 
Expected utility theory helps economists to understand how people make 
decisions, it does, however, have some drawbacks, for example, in the context 
of probability weighting or loss aversion (Starmer, 2000). The fact that people 
exhibit inconsistencies when confronted with multiple options is not new 
(Hilton, 1989). Up to now the main contributions to the debate on expected 
utility and risk aversion lies in testing the hypotheses of expected utility theory 
with respect to income changes (McKee, 1989; Palacios-Huerta Serrano, 2006). 
Researchers need to address the issue of inconsistency with expected utility 
to better predict individual behavior. To test theoretical hypotheses, researchers 
control experiments by altering the attributes of the game. In this paper we 
focus on individual inconsistencies with expected utility, assuming that money 
behaves as normal good for everybody, independently initial economic 
resources. To give an example of a failure in internal consistency, let’s assume 
that an individual has revealed preferences for the fixed amount of money, 
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rather than for the lottery ticket. Given that money behaves as a normal good, if 
the researcher increases the fixed amount of money keeping constant the 
parameters of the lottery ticket, the internal consistency will guarantee that the 
individual will choose the fixed amount of money again. Consequently, we can 
assume that those individuals who preferred the fixed amount of money the first 
time and chose the lottery ticket the second were inconsistent in their 
preferences.  
Risk aversion indexes based on lottery questions have been used recently to 
study risk attitudes (Sasaki et al., 2006; Schunk Winter, 2007). To extrapolate 
uncertainty to risk behaviors we must consider that uncertainty encompasses all 
decisions involving nontrivial, state-contingent outcome vectors, whether or not 
the preferences and beliefs associated with these decisions can be characterized 
by well-defined subjective probabilities. Events for which subjective 
probabilities are well-defined will be referred to as unambiguous. In 
consonance, events for which subjective probabilities are not well-defined will 
be referred to as ambiguous. Problems involving acts measurable with respect to 
unambiguous events will be said to involve risk (Grant Quiggin 2005). Taking 
into account these definitions, lifestyles are characterized by externalities with 
ambiguous probabilities.  
Two recent research papers that have analyzed the consumption of drugs as 
risk behavior in a framework of expected utility (Blondel et al., 2007; Dave 
Saffer 2007), have shown that drug users are significantly more risk seeking 
than non-drug users. Dave and Saffer (2007) also confirm that risk aversion has 
a significant and negative effect on alcohol consumption, with the prevalence 
and consumption among risk-tolerant individuals being six to eight percent 
higher. 
Experiments offer a new field for social researchers to identify the causation 
of different behaviors on health. Most research on risk behaviors typically 
examines lottery questions in computer laboratories in which participants must 
select an option from various choices that vary according to potential risks 
(Chapman et al., 2007).  
In this research, we introduce two different measures of risk aversion. One 
risk aversion measure is self-reported by the interviewees and shows how 
averse they perceive themselves to be. The other is calculated through the 
answers of the lottery games. The reason why we consider two kinds of 
measures is that when we make a decision, we may take into account different 
points of view and not only the monetary criteria involved in the lottery games. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The German Personality and Daily Life Survey (German Institute for 
Economic Research, 2004) provided us with the variables required for this 
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research. The sample size is 1012 individuals from 14 to 90 years old (543 
females and 469 males). 
The reason why we selected this survey is because it offers individual 
information about socio-demographic characteristics, behaviors and risk 
attitudes that include lottery questions. However, we have not introduced 
regional dummy variables as explanatory variables because information about 
where people live is not available. These variables would improve the estimated 
coefficients of the model by summarizing regional differences. 
There are two sets of lottery games. In the first set, the individual can choose 
between a fixed amount of money or a lottery ticket. The lottery ticket is 
characterized by a prize of 200 Euros with a winning probability of 50%. The 
game is repeated four times, thus the fixed amount of money increases from 40 
to 130 Euros - 30 Euros each time. Consequently, the greater the fixed amount 
of money, the higher are the incentives to choose it because the characteristics 
of the lottery ticket remain constant. The main difference with the second set is 
that the individual might win 160 Euros but also lose 40 Euros. The 
probabilities of winning and losing money are the same (50%). The lottery 
ticket remains invariable, and the fixed amount of money increases from 0 to 90 
Euros, 30 Euros each time. 
The sample is equally distributed by gender. The average age of the 
interviewees was 48 years old and they have a monthly net salary of 515 Euros. 
The salary variable has a great dispersion because 45% of the interviewed are 
inactive (students, housewives and retired people). 
31% of the interviewees smoke. The Spanish National Delegation on Drug 
Uses (2001) suggests that people who smoke more than 10 cigarettes per day 
are at risk of becoming nicotine addicts. We do not distinguish between high-
risk smokers (individuals who smoke at least 10 cigarettes per day) and low-risk 
smokers (individuals who smoke less than 10 cigarettes per day) because most 
smokers (nearly 80%) are high-risk smokers. 
With regards to the lottery questions, we noted that the greater the fixed 
amount of money, the greater was the percentage of people who chose it against 
the lottery ticket. For example, 44% of the interviewed chose the fixed amount 
of money in the game R1, whereas 78% chose it in the game R4.  
The only difference in both games is that in the first, the fixed amount of 
money is 40 Euros whilst in the second it is 130 Euros. The percentages of 
people choosing the fixed amount of money are slightly higher for the second 
set where people might win or lose money if they choose the lottery ticket. In 
this case, 78% of the interviewees chose the fixed amount of money in game 
R5, 76% choose it in game R8. 
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 Persönlichkeit und Alltag Personality and Daily Life 
A) Sozio-demographische 
Charakteristikum 
A) Socio-demographic characteristics 
Bitte geben Sie hier Geschlecht und 
Geburtsjahr: 
Männlich  □        Geburtsjahr: 
Weiblich   □ 
Please state your gender and year of 
birth: 
Male    □        Year of birth: 
Female   □ 
Wie hoch war Ihr Arbeitsverdienst im 
letzten Monat? 
Wenn Sie im letzten Monat 
Sonderzahlungen hatten, z.B. 
Urlaubsgeld oder Nachzahlungen, 
rechnen Sie diese bitte nicht mit. Entgelt 
für Überstunden rechnen Sie dagegen 
mit. 
Falls Sie selbständig sind: Bitte schätzen 
Sie Ihren monatlichen Gewinn vor und 
nach Steuer und Sozialversicherung 
Brutto:      EURO / Netto:       EURO 
What was your salary last month? 
Please, include overtime pay but not any 
extra month’s salary or delayed salary. 
In case you are self-employed, please 
value your monthly net and gross profit. 
 
Gross:      EURO / Netto:       EURO 
B) Verhalten B) Behaviors 
Rauchen Sie gegenwärtig, seien es 
Zigaretten, Pfeifen oder Zigarren? 
Nein  □     Ja    □  
Wieviel Zigaretten, Pfeifen oder Zigarren 
rauchen Sie pro Tag? Geben Sie bitte 
den täglichen Durchschnitt der letzten 
Woche an. 
Zigaretten:     Pfeifen:  
Zigarren/Zigarillos: 
Do you smoke cigarettes, a pipe or 
cigars? 
No  □     Yes    □  
How many cigarettes, pipes or cigars did 
you smoke per day in the last week? 
Cigarettes:     Pipes:     Cigars: 
C) Risiko Einstellungen C) Risk attitudes 
Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: 
Sind Sie im allgemeinen ein 
risikobereiter Mensch oder versuchen 
Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der 
Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: 
"gar nicht risikobereit" und der Wert 10: 
"sehr risikobereit": 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
How do you describe your personality? 
Do you usually take risks or do you try to 
avoid them? 
Mark how risk averse or risk seeking you 
consider yourself to be (0 = “totally risk 
averse”, 1 = “very risk seeking": 0 1 2 3 4 
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Table 1 (continuación) 
The survey 
 Persönlichkeit und Alltag Personality and Daily Life 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie nehmen an einer 
Quizshow teil, bei der Sie auch Geld 
gewinnen können. Dabei entscheiden 
Sie selbst in welcher Form: Sie können 
entweder einen festen Geldbetrag 
bekommen oder an einer Lotterie 
teilnehmen. Bei der Lotterie gewinnen 
Sie mit einer Chance von 50:50 
entweder 200 Euro oder Sie bekommen 
nichts. 
Bitte sehen Sie sich einmal Liste an. Dort 
steht in jeder Zeile, wie Sie sich 
entscheiden können. Treffen Sie Ihre 
Entscheidung bitte zunächst in Zeile 1, 
dann in Zeile 2 usw. 
Wie würden Sie sich entscheiden  
in Zeile 1? Fester Betrag 40 Euro oder 
Lotterielos 
in Zeile 2? Fester Betrag 70 Euro oder 
Lotterielos 
in Zeile 3? Fester Betrag 100 Euro oder 
Lotterielos 
in Zeile 4? Fester Betrag 130 Euro oder 
Lotterielos  
ZP kann sich nicht entscheiden und 
verweigert die Antwort □ 
Imagine you are taking part in a Quiz 
show in which you could win money. You 
have to choose between a fixed amount 
of money and a lottery ticket. The lottery 
prize is 200 Euros; the probability of 
winning the prize is 50%. 
Please look at the list of questions. Mark, 
in each line, if you prefer the fixed 
amount of money or the lottery ticket. 
Answer the question in order. 
What would you choose: 
in line 1? 40 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 2? 70 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 3? 100 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 4? 130 Euros or the lottery ticket 
I do not know / No answer  □ 
Nun stellen Sie sich vor, in der Quizshow 
werden die Regeln etwas verändert. 
Wieder haben sie vorab die Wahl 
zwischen einem festen Geldbetrag und 
einer Lotterie. Bei der Lotterie können 
Sie mit einer Gewinnchance von 50:50 
entweder 160 Euro gewinnen oder 
diesmal 40 Euro verlieren. 
Wie würden Sie sich entscheiden  
in Zeile 1? Fester Betrag 0 Euro oder 
Lotterielos 
in Zeile 2? Fester Betrag 30 Euro oder 
Lotterielos  
in Zeile 3? Fester Betrag 60 Euro oder 
Lotterielos  
in Zeile 4? Fester Betrag 90 Euro oder 
Lotterielos 
ZP kann sich nicht entscheiden und 
verweigert die Antwort □ 
Imagine that the Quiz show changes the 
rules of the game. Again you have to 
choose between a fixed amount of 
money and a lottery ticket. If you choose 
the lottery ticket you could win 160 Euros 
or loose 40 Euros with probabilities of 
50%. 
What would you choose: 
in line 1? 0 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 2? 30 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 3? 60 Euros or the lottery ticket 
in line 4? 90 Euros or the lottery ticket 
I do not know / No answer □ 
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Given the technical characteristics of the lottery questions considered in the 
German Personality and Daily Life Survey, we calculated the following indexes 
that encapsulate the individual inconsistency level and expected utility and risk 
aversion: 
 IEU summarizes the individual internal inconsistency level with the 
expected utility. Those participants who chose a fixed amount of money in a 
game would be expected to choose it again if all the parameters were constant 
except for the fixed amount of money (that would be increased). For example, 
an individual who chose the fixed amount of money in game R2 would be 
expected to choose this option in games R3 and R4. Observing the number of 
reversals from the fixed amount of money to the lottery ticket in each set of 
games allows us to define this index as the number of times the individual 
changes decisions to risk options divided by the maximum number of changes. 
As the maximum number of changes is 8, IEU takes 9 different values from 0 
(the individual is internally consistent) to 1 (the individual is internally 
inconsistent). The nature of the experiment maintains the consistency of 
preferences because participants do not learn from past experiences, they reply 
to lottery questions hypothetically. The data reveals that most participants are 
consistent with expected utility. The average level of inconsistency is around 
11%, on a scale of 100. The data also reveals that the level of inconsistency is 
higher for the second set of games (13%) than for the first set (9%). 
 CRRA summarizes the inconsistency level on the assumption of 
constant relative risk aversion. The CRRA means that preferences among risk 
prospects are unchanged if all payoffs are multiplied by a positive constant. The 
CRRA helps us to look for the deviations of the pattern. Such deviations would 
not necessarily reflect misunderstanding. A first step before defining the CRRA 
is to establish the proportions relative to each game. The value of these 
proportions is the fixed amount of money divided by the maximum prize of the 
lottery ticket. The proportions are 0.20, 0.35, 0.50 and 0.65 for the first set of 
games and 0, 0.19, 0.37 and 0.56 for the second set of games. Given these 
proportions, the ordered sequence of games is established as it follows: R5, R6, 
R1, R2, R7, R3, R8, R4. Given this ordering, an individual who chose the fixed 
amount of money in the game R7 could be expected to choose the fixed amount 
of money in games R3, R8 and R4. A violation of this ordering might be 
considered a failure of constant relative risk assumption. People are likely to be 
internally consistent in accordance with the assumption of constant relative risk: 
48% showed degrees of inconsistency. This index revealed a much higher 
percentage of inconsistency than the previous one. 
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Variable Description Mean St. Dev. 
Gender 
This variable takes the value of 1 if the individual is male 
and 0 if female. 
0.4634 0.4989 
Age This variable gives us the individual’s age. 47.5549 18.3708 
Smoker 
This variable takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
smoker and 0 if a non-smoker. 
0.3102 0.4343 
Income This variable gives us the individual’s net monthly income. 514.8436 942.0700 
Games    
R1 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [  40 , 1 ] or [ 200 , 0.5 ;  0 , 0.5 ] 
0.4411 0.4967 
R2 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [  70 , 1 ] or [ 200 , 0.5 ;  0 , 0.5 ] 
0.4455 0.4972 
R3 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [ 100 , 1 ] or [ 200 , 0.5 ;  0 , 0.5 ] 
0.6482 0.4777 
R4 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [ 130 , 1 ] or [ 200 , 0.5 ;  0 , 0.5 ] 
0.7806 0.4140 
R5 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [   0 , 1 ] or [ 160 , 0.5 ; -40 , 0.5 ] 
0.3206 0.4685 
R6 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [  30 , 1 ] or [ 160 , 0.5 ; -40 , 0.5 ] 
0.4711 0.4994 
R7 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [  60 , 1 ] or [ 160 , 0.5 ; -40 , 0.5 ] 
0.6959 0.4605 
R8 
This variable tells us if the individual chose the safe option 
in the game: [  90 , 1 ] or [ 160 , 0.5 ; -40 , 0.5 ] 
0.7621 0.4259 
Indexes    
IEU Internal inconsistency in the two set of games: R1-R4 and 
R5-R8. This variable takes values of 0 (internally 
consistent) and1 (internally inconsistent). 
0.1136 0.1775 
IEU1 Internal inconsistency in the first set of games: R1-R4. 0.0903 0.2069 
IEU2 Internal inconsistency in the second set of games: R5-R8. 0.1278 0.2452 
CRRA Internal inconsistency in the two set of games on the 
assumption of constant relative risk attitude. 
0.4762 0.4996 
Penalty Penalty from the ordering violation related to the 
assumption of constant relative risk attitude. 
0.3549 0.7054 
IRA Number of times that the subject chose the safe option 
divided by the number of games (0: risk-taker to 1: risk-
averse). 
0.5481 0.3281 
IRA1 Number of times that the subject chose the safe option 
divided by the number of games: R1-R4. 
0.5560 0.3831 
IRA2 Number of times that the subject chose the safe option 
divided by the number of games: R5-R8. 
0.5402 0.3400 
DIRA The distance of IRA to the middle value in absolute terms 
(from 0: risk neutral to 0.5: no risk neutral). 
0.2796 0.1607 




 The penalty is measured as the difference in the proportions as a 
consequence of the ordering violation. For example, a subject who chose the 
fixed amount of money in R2 but the lottery ticket in R7 would only receive a 
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small penalty (0.37-0.35=0.02) compared to an individual who chose the fixed 
amount of money in R1 but the lottery ticket in R2 (0.19-0=0.19). The average 
penalty was 0.35 points. 
 IRA summarizes the individual degree of risk aversion. It is measured 
as the number of games in which the subject chose the fixed amount of money, 
divided by the total number of games. That means that this variable takes values 
from 0 to 1. A ‘0’ indicates that the individual is an absolute risk-taker and 1 
that the individual is absolutely risk averse. On average, participants were 
moderately risk averse: in 55% of the games, the interviewee chose the fixed 
amount of money rather than the lottery ticket. The level of risk aversion is 
quite similar between both sets of games. This result is because the percentage 
of people who chose the fixed amount of money in game R5 is very low. If we 
had excluded R1 and R5 in the definition of IRA1 and IRA2, the average 
percentage of IRA2 would have been greater. Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to think that people would be more risk averse if they could have lost money 
when they acquired the lottery ticket. 
 DIRA measures the distance between IRA and the median value (0.5), 
and it measures how risk-neutral the individual is. The distance is considered in 
absolute values, so this variable takes values from 0 to 0.5. Values close to 0 
mean that the individual is risk-neutral. The reason why we introduced this 
variable is to control the fact that risk-neutral people are less likely to be 
internally consistent, given the technical properties of the internally consistent 
indexes. 
 ISRA summarizes individual self-perception of risk aversion. 
Interviewed subjects identified their grade of risk aversion on a scale of 0 to 1. 
‘0’ indicating that the individual perceives himself/herself as absolute risk taker 
and 1 as absolutely risk averse. On average, participants saw themselves as 
moderately risk averse. 
The reason why we consider two indices of risk aversion lies in their nature. 
IRA reflects individual risk aversion from lottery questions, whereas ISRA is 
the corresponding individual self-perception. ISRA reflects how comfortable 
the participants feel at the time of confronting risks. Self-perception is 
conditioned by the individual’s point of view. Self-reported answers are usually 
centered the individual, so for example, we believe that other people who take 
more risks than us are risk seeking. 
In the following section, we summarize the main results. In Table 3, we 
show the correlation values between risk aversion and internal consistency 
indexes. One of the main contributions of this paper is to point out that even 
correlation parameters should be treated with care. In Table 4, we demonstrate 
that people who are risk neutral are also more susceptible to being inconsistent, 
given the technical properties of both indexes.  
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Table 5 validates the results shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 6 shows that 
socio-demographic characteristics play an important role as explanatory 
variables of both indexes. Table 5 reinforces the results of Tables 3 and 4.  
Finally, these results might have important consequences for the welfare 
economics, especially for the issue of risk behaviors. We conclude with Tables 
6 and 7 as an applied example of tobacco consumption.  
4. RESULTS 
A basic table of correlations shows that people who are more consistent 
when taking decisions are also more risk averse. This relationship remains 
stable in sense and magnitude: people that take consistent decisions are more 
risk averse than people who take inconsistent decisions; the more consistent the 
individuals, the more risk averse they behave.  In terms of self-perception, IRA 
and ISRA are correlated in a way that could be expected: people who consider 




Correlation between  inconsistency and risk aversion indexes (Spearman). 
 
 IEU CRRA Penalty IRA 
IRA -0.1763* -0.2381* -0.1213* — 
ISRA -0.1347*  0.1175* -0.1497* 0.2000*  
 
* indicates that the parameter is statistically significant at the level 5%. 
Table 4 provides further empirical evidence: both those individuals who are 
more risk averse and those who are greater risk takers are more consistent in 
their decisions. As a consequence, people who are risk-neutral are more 
susceptible to being inconsistent.  
 
Table 4 
Distribution of individuals by levels of internal inconsistency and risk aversion 
IEU 
IRA 
0 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 
0 121 0 0 0 0 0 
0.125 22 0 0 0 0 0 
0.25 3 42 1 32 3 0 
0.375 4 85 0 1 1 0 
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Table 4 (continuación) 
Distribution of individuals by levels of internal inconsistency and risk aversion 
IEU 
IRA 
0 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 
0.5 23 0 53 2 0 66 
0.625 7 10 1 0 2 0 
0.75 6 101 0 0 1 0 
0.875 179 0 0 0 0 0 
1 126 0 0 0 0 0 
This result is derived from the fact that high levels of risk aversion or risk 
seeking prevent individuals from changing their minds. For example, when 
individuals have strong preferences for safe outcomes, their levels of risk 
aversion prevent them from selecting the riskier options. If they are more likely 
to choose the safe option independently of the possible outcomes, they will 
choose the risky option less often, and as a consequence, they will be more 
consistent with their decisions. Theoretically, there might be individuals with 
IEU levels of 0.75, 0.875 and 1, but in practice the highest level of internal 
inconsistency is 0.625. The 66 individuals who were the most internally 
inconsistent (IEU = 0.625), are risk-neutral (IRA = 0.5). 
The results shown Table 4 are summarized and validated by Table 5.Those 
individuals who are more risk averse are more internally consistent, however 
the penalty they suffer from their internal inconsistency is lower. The further 
IRA is from the mean value (0.5) for DIRA, the greater is the internal 
inconsistency. In fact, the magnitude of the parameters reveals that the influence 
of the distance of IRA from the mean value is more important than IRA itself. 
This result is similar to that shown in table 4. The most risk averse and the 
higher risk takers are consistent in their decisions. 
Table 5 
 Estimation of internal inconsistency (OLSQ) 
 
IEU CRRA Penalty 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
IRA -0.0469*** 0.0125 -0.2596*** 0.0375 -0.1479*** 0.0602 
DIRA -0.7004*** 0.0238 -1.7048*** 0.0719 -1.8688*** 0.1153 






Number of observations = 1012 
*** indicates that the parameter is statistically significant at the level 1%. 
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These results have important consequences for the analysis of risk behaviors. 
In this paper, we focus on how internal coherence and risk aversion interact 
with tobacco consumption decisions. Given that risk aversion, internal 
consistency and smoking might share some important determinants, we 
analyzed their correlation with socio-demographic variables. Age and being 
female is positively correlated with smoking, whereas income is negatively 
correlated. Results suggest that marginal utility of money is greater for smokers 
than for non-smokers. This last result is important because if those individuals 
who smoke had lower budgets, they would be more risk averse in lottery games 
in order to buy tobacco products. In fact smokers are more likely to choose the 
fixed amount of money rather than the lottery ticket.  
With internal inconsistency, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. IEU is 
negatively correlated with the decision to smoke whilst CRRA is positively 
correlated. However as the index was based on the assumption of constant 
relative risk, we observe that the penalty for the ordering violation is negatively 
correlated with the decision to smoke, therefore, although smokers might be 
internally inconsistent, there may be non-smokers who are even less internally 
consistent. This result is revealing because, compared to non-smokers, smokers 
do not behave incoherently; what is more, they do not behave as risk takers but 
as risk averse.  
Table 6 
 Correlation of indexes and individual characteristics (Spearman). 
 
 IEU CRRA Penalty IRA ISRA Smoker 
Age -0.3792* -0.0865* -0.2668* 0.1895* 0.2186* 0.0503* 
Gender 0.0761* 0.0559* 0.0115 0.006 -0.2516* -0.0301* 
Income -0.0987* -0.0154 0.0605* 0.0533* -0.0916* -0.1857* 
Smoker -0.1168* 0.0565* -0.0729* 0.0771* 0.0148 — 
 
* indicates that the parameter is statistically significant at the level 5%. 
We further observed that income is positively correlated with risk aversion 
and internal consistency, but negatively correlated with the perception of risk 
aversion. Age is positively correlated with internal consistency and risk 
aversion. Gender differences reveal that men are more internally inconsistent 
than women and they perceive themselves as risk takers. 
The estimation of the probability of being a smoker also confirms these 
results. We repeated the estimation three times. We considered all games 
without making any distinction for those that belong to the first set or the 
second set (Model 1 and Model 3), and then took account of the fact  that these 
Estudios de Economía Aplicada, 2011: 1-18  Vol. 29-1 
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY AND RISK AVERSIÓN: IMPLICATIONS ON SMOKING DECISIONS 15 
results might vary depending on the characteristics of wining and losing with 
the lottery tickets (Model 2). We also considered that the different internal 
inconsistency indexes were built under similar premises, so it is better to repeat 
estimations for IEU and CRRA/Penalty (Models 1 and 2 and Model 3) to 
avoid problems of m…ulticollineality. 
Table 7 
Estimation of Smokers (Probit) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Coefficient Mfx Coefficient Mfx Coefficient Mfx 
Gender  0.0321  0.0084 -0.0350 -0.0090 -0.0574 
-0.0155 
Age -0.0078** -0.0020 -0.0064* -0.0016 -0.0072** 
-0.0019 
Income -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0004*** 
-0.0001 
IEU -2.2826*** -0.5978 — — — — 
IEU1 — — -0.6920** -0.1765 — — 
IEU2 — — -1.7920*** -0.4572 — — 
CRRA — — — —  0.4718*** 
 0.1292 
Penalty — — — — -0.2541*** 
-0.0687 
IRA  0.7329***  0.1919 — —  0.8133*** 
 0.2195 
IRA1 — —  0.1947 0.0497 — — 
IRA2 — —  0.4895*** 0.1249 — — 
DIRA -0.5655 -0.1481 -0.6767 -0.1727  1.0994*** 0.2966 
ISRA -0.5808** -0.1521 -0.5691** -0.1452 -0.6263*** -0.1690 
Intercept -0.0257 —  0.0077 — -0.8136*** — 
Ps.-R2 (%) 10.16 10.89 8.45 




Number of observations = 864. Real probability of smoker: 23.02%. 
***, ** and * indicate that the parameter is statistically significant at the levels 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Results confirm that smokers are internally consistent and especially in 
games where they can also lose money. If we impose the assumption of 
constant relative risk, we observe that those individual who are internally 
inconsistent are more likely to be smokers, but the greater the penalty for this 
inconsistency, the lower is this probability. Again, smokers behave as risk 
averse. The results of Model 2 suggest that the influence of risk aversion is 
greater for lottery tickets that include a loss of money as a possible outcome. 
Individuals, who consider themselves as risk averse, are less likely to smoke. 
Once we allow for the different levels of penalty individuals suffer from 
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violating the constant risk attitude, the more risk averse and risk seeking the 
individuals are, the more likely they are to smoke. 
With socio-demographic characteristics we found that younger individuals 
and those with lower incomes are more likely to smoke. 
Finally, we would emphasize two tests of global significance. The three 
models slightly undervalue the probability of being a smoker by two percentage 
points. Estimated probabilities are very similar between models. According to 
the pseudo- R2, Model 2 has the greatest explanatory power, followed by Model 
1 and Model 3. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on how expected utility 
determines individual risk aversion. Firstly, descriptive statistics demonstrate 
that although most individuals are consistent with previous decisions, there is 
also evidence that some individuals do not have a coherent scale of preferences. 
This is especially true when we consider the assumption of constant relative risk 
to define the internal inconsistency index. People who are more risk neutral 
seem to be less internally consistent, but this argument is derived from the fact 
that people who have strong levels of risk aversion or risk affinity are less likely 
to change their minds when they face different options. 
With regards to risk behaviors, the main conclusion of these empirical 
results is that smokers are internally consistent and might even be risk averse. 
This result has important implications for policy making because if individuals 
are able to organize their decisions coherently, then providing information that 
is effective enough to change preferences might be useful to reduce the adoption 
of risk behaviors such as smoking. 
Regarding the adequacy of lottery games to assess risk aversion levels, we 
are concerned that the indexes obtained may be biased. IRA basically 
summarizes the risk aversion from a monetary point of view and it obviates 
other dimensions such as the social pressure.  
Another issue is that previous research has pointed out that risk aversion and 
risk affinity might vary substantially by ethnic background and socioeconomic 
position (Hahn et al., 2000). Cross-sectional data does not allow testing if the 
differences between two population groups are attributable to observed or 
unobserved variables. 
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